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ABSTRACT 
This paper continues the work of Abeledo and Rothblum, who study nonbipartite 
stable matching problems from a polyhedral perspective. We establish here additional 
properties of fractional stable matchings and use linear programming to obtain an 
alternative polynomial algorithm for solving stable matching problems. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In a stable matching problem agents have to be matched in pairs while 
having strict preferences over their potential mates. The goal is to find a 
matching where no two agents prefer being matched to each other over their 
outcomes in the matching, where singlehood is considered worse than being 
paired with any admissible mate. Gale and Shapley [5] call such a matching 
stable, since it will remain unchanged if the agents act rationally. 
A special case of the stable matching problem is the stable marriage 
problem, where each agent is labeled as either “man” or “woman” and all 
matchable pairs consist of a man and a woman. Gale and Shapley [5] 
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described a polynomial algorithm that computes a stable matching for any 
given stable marriage problem. A nonbipartite stable matching problem is 
also known as a stable roommates problem. In this case, Gale and Shapley [S] 
showed that stable matchings do not always exist. Settling a question raised by 
Knuth 191, Irving [7] obtained the first polynomial algorithm that either finds 
a stable matching, or determines that none exists, for problems where all 
pairs of agents are matchable. Gusfield and Irving [6] showed how to modify 
this algorithm to handle arbitrary stable matching problems. 
Stable matching problems have a wealth of structural properties that have 
been explored over the past three decades using combinatorial techniques. A 
new approach for studying stable matching problems was initiated by Vande 
Vate [15] and Rothblum [13], who showed, for the stable marriage problem, 
that a simple system of linear inequalities describes the stable matching 
polytope, i.e., the convex hull of the incidence vectors of the stable match- 
ings. This result allowed Roth, Rothblum, and Vande Vate [ll] to use linear 
programming theory to derive known properties of stable marriage problems 
and to extend these to fractional stable matchings. Abeledo and Rothblum [2] 
expanded this approach to the general case, where the underlying graph is 
not necessarily bipartite, by studying properties of the fractional stable 
matching polytope, which is a relaxation of the stable matching polytope and 
whose integral vectors are also the incidence vectors of the stable matchings. 
In this paper we continue the analysis of stable matching problems from a 
polyhedral perspective. One of our main results here shows that we can 
associate with each fractional stable matching a polytope which is a subset of 
the fractional stable matching polytope and which contains an integral vector 
if (and only if) the original problem has a stable matching. We then show how 
to generate, using linear programming, a sequence of fractional stable match- 
ings whose associated polytopes are monotonically decreasing. This procedure 
stops when it identifies a stable matching or reaches a conclusion that no such 
matching exists. As linear programming problems can be solved in polynomial 
time, this procedure yields an alternative polynomial algorithm for solving 
stable matching problems. We remark, however, that it is not competitive 
with Irving’s from a complexity standpoint. 
For further results, applications, and history of stable matching problems, 
see the books by Gusfield and Irving [6] and Roth and Sotomayor [12]. 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
2.1. Graphs and Matchings 
We shall only be concerned here with finite undirected graphs without 
loops or multiple edges. For graph theory definitions see, e.g., [3]. Let 
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G = (V, E) be a graph with vertex set V and edge set E. For each o E V, 
N(u) = (u: (v, U) E E) is the set of neighbors of u. 
We will consider vectors r E RE, indexed by the edges of G, such that 
0 < x, < 1 for every e E E. We call such vectors half-integral if they belong 
to (0, k, 1)‘. Let x E RE be a nonnegative vector; then the set of edges 
E+(x) = ((u, u) E E: x, ” > 0) is the support of X. Also, for each nonnega- 
tive scalar 8, we define the set of edges E,(x) = ((u, u) E E: x,,,, = 8). 
A matching for G = (V, E) is a subset p c E such that no two edges in 
p have a common vertex. A matching p defines a one-to-one mapping p(.) 
from the set V onto itself where p(u) = u if (u, E) E p and p.(u) = u if no 
edge in p contains v. We call p(o) the outcome of o under the matching (u. 
If p(u) = u, then u is single or unmatched in p. Otherwise, if p(u) z u, we 
say that v is matched to /J(V). The matching p can be represented by an 
incidence vector x E (0, l)E such that x, D = 1, if (zl, u) E p, and x,, , = 0 
otherwise. 
2.2. The Stable Matching Problem 
We formally define a stable matching problem as a pair (G; P) where 
G = (V, E) is a graph and P is a mapping on V such that, for each vertex 
u E V, P(u) is a strict linear order on N(o) U (u) that has c) as its last 
element. We call G the acceptability graph, P the preference profile, and 
P(u) the preference of vertex v. 
We will usually represent the preference of a vertex c by cc . In 
particular, for U, w in N(u) U (u), we write u <v w if P(v) orders w before 
u; and we say that 0 prefers w to u. Note that, as P(v) ranks o last, we have 
that 11 >r c for each u E N(v). We express by u <C w that either u <,> u: 
or u = zu. Finally, for a vertex 0 and a nonempty set of vertices S c N(o), 
let min, S and max, S denote, respectively, the least preferred and the most 
preferred element in S with respect to the preference of U. Further, we 
define min.0 = max,0 = (0). 
A pair (u, v) E E is a blocking pair for a matching p if 
CL(U) <,, IJ and (u) <, Il. 
i.e., (u, o) is a blocking pair for p if both vertices prefer being matched to 
each other over their outcome under p. A matching p is stable if it has no 
blocking pair. Equivalently, p is a stable matching for (G; P> if the following 
stability condition holds for each (u, v) E E: 
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To solve a stable matching problem means to either find a stable matching 
for the problem or to determine that no such matching exists. 
The algorithm of Gale and Shapley [5], combined with an appropriate 
labeling of the vertices, shows that stable matching problems with bipartite 
graphs always have a stable matching. Abeledo and Isaak [l] showed that, 
given a nonbipartite graph, it is always possible to define a preference profile 
so that the resulting problem does not have a stable matching. 
3. FRACTIONAL STABLE MATCHINGS 
3.1. Basic Definitions and Results 
Henceforth, (G; P> denotes a given stable matching problem with graph 
G = (V, E). We define the stable matching polytope SM(G; P) of the 
problem (G; P) as the convex hull of the incidence vectors of its stable 
matchings. We describe below a system of linear inequalities that must be 
satisfied by all vectors in SM(G; P). 
LEMMA 3.1 [2]. The incidence vectors of the stable matchings of (G; P) 
are the integer solutions of the following system of linear inequalities: 
c x,,,,~l for-each v E: V, (2) 
uGiv(z;) 
xt, ” >  0 foreach {u,v) E E, (3) 
C x,,,~ + C x,,,~ +x,,,: 2 1 for-each (u,v) EE, (4) 
i > ,, D .i>, u 
where i >#, v denotes (i E N(u): i >{, v} and j >c u denotes (j E I: 
j >n u). 
We call constraints (4) the stability constraints. Solutions of (21, (3), and 
(4) are called fractional stable matchings of (G; P). The fractional stable 
matching polytope is the set of all fractional stable matchings and will be 
denoted FSM(G; P). The following assertion follows trivially. 
LEMMA 3.2. FSM(G; P) 2 SM(G; P). Further, FSM(G; P) = 
SM(G; P) $and only ifth e extreme points of FSM(G; P) are integer. 
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Vande Vate [15] and Rothblum [13] h 5 owed that the stable matching 
polytope of a problem with a bipartite graph is described bv the linear system 
of Lemma 3.1. 
THEOKE~Z 3.3 [13]. !f G is (I biparfite gruph. then SM(G: P) = 
FSM(G; P). 
The next theorem, proved in [2], asserts that the fractional stable match- 
ing polytope is always nonempt>, and establishes the half-integrality of its 
extreme points. 
In particular, as SM(G; P) is empty when (G: P) has no stable matching. 
the above result shows that the inequalities (2), (31, and (4) do not always 
describe SM(G; P). Further, the possibility of obtaining an NP-description 
(see [lo]) of a class of linear inequalities that describes the stable matching 
polytope of every problem seems m&k+. This is ;I consequence of a result 
by Feder [3], who proved that finding a stable matching that mauimizcas 
II linear objective function is NP-hard. Thus, any NP-description of the 
stable matching polytope would imply that NP = co-NP (see Karp i111d 
Papadimitriou [8]). In spite of the abo\~ difficulties. it is shown in [L?] that 
many properties of stable matchings iii-e shared I)? all fractional stable 
matchings and thus are captured bv the simple linear system that defir~s t11cd 
fractional stable matching polytop;. 
The next theorem, applied to the incider1c.e vectors of stable nlatcllings. 
shows that the set of matched vertices is in\,ariant for eves stable nratchillr:. 
c .Tj,, = 0 if 2) E I”’ 
,jE.V(r ) 
c ?;,,,=I if r:E\“. 
jG9(1-) 
Henceforth, we shall refer by I”’ and V ’ to the sets defined in Theorenl 
3.!5. 
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COROLLARY 3.6. Zf IV’1 is odd, then (G; P) has no stable matching. 
A pair {u, v] E E is called a fractional stable pair if there exists a 
fractional stable matching x E FSM(G; P) with x,,, > 0. This definition 
extends the notion of stable [6] or achievable [U] pairs, which means the 
pairs that are matched together in some stable matching. Of course, stable 
pairs are fractional stable pairs, but the converse is not always valid. 
THEOREM 3.7 [2]. Let {u, v} be a fractional stable pair. For every 
x E FSM(G; P> 
We remark that the above result, specialized to stable pairs and incidence 
vectors of stable matchings, implies that if two vertices are matched together 
in a particular stable matching, then there exists no other stable matching 
that is preferred by both vertices. 
3.2. Extended Suppotis of Fractional Stable Matchings 
Let x E FSM(G; P>. We define the mappings ii;,(*) and cX(*> from V 
into itself by 
_a,(~) = min,{u E N(v): x,,, > 0} 
and 
i?,(v) = max,{u E N(v): x,,, > 0}, 
where we remind the reader that min.0 = max “0 = v. Clearly, if x is the 
incidence vector of a stable matching p, then for all v E V we have 
rrI(v) = Z%;(v) = p(v). The next result asserts that the mappings a;(.> and 
gX(*) are the inverse of each other. 
LEMMA 3.8 [21. Let x E FSM(G; P). Then, for u, v E V, 
v = gz(u) ifand only if u = C,(v). 
LEMMA 3.9. Let {u, v} be a fractional stable pair, and let x be a 
fractional stable matching. Then u co _a,(~) if and only if v >u C,(u). 
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Proof. As (u, o} is a fractional stable pair, both u and u are in V ’ and 
therefore 
c X,,,‘ = c xj,o = 1. (6) 
i EN(U) j‘z;N(u) 
Further, Theorem 3.7 implies 
C xi.u + C Xj," +x,,, = l. (7) 
i>,l; j >,, 11 
Thus, Cj >,u xj, li = 1 if and only if Xi a,,v xi, u = 0. This combines with (6) to 
show that u cD am if and only if u >,1 Cz;(u). H 
A main concept that we introduce now is the extended support of a 
fractional stable matching. Let x E FSM(G; P) then its extended support 
T(x) is the set of edges 
T(x) = {{UJI} E E:gx(u) =G” u <c i?,(u) and _a,(~) G,, u G,, Z,(u)}. 
(8) 
It immediately follows that the extended support contains the support 
E+(x) G T(x). (9) 
Further, if x is the incidence vector of a stable matching /J, then _a,(~) = 
C,(v) = p(z)) for every o E V, and T(x) = /.L. 
The next lemma characterizes the set of edges that are not in the 
extended support of a given fractional stable matching. 
LEMMA 3.10. Let x E FSMCG; P). Then {u, v} E E \ T(x) if and only 
ifu cc gx(u) o?- 2) -cu VJU). 
Proof. The “if” part of the lemma follows from the definition of T(x) in 
(8). To prove the “only if” part, let {u, u} E E \ T(x) and assume to the 
contrary that u a0 _-x u (u) and u au _a,(~). As {u, U} E T(x), the definition of 
T(x) in (8) implies that at least one of the two inequalities u >. C%,(U) and 
v >,, ZX;(u> is met. Without loss of generality, assume that u >c i?,(u). Then 
cj>,~ “0,j = 0. Now, if u E V” then C, + x,,, i = Ci E Ncu) x,, i = 0. If, 
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alternatively, u E V1, then the assumption that o au crX(u> implies that 
Ci>,fi x,,~ < I - x,~,~,(~) < 1. In either case, Xi>,” x,,~ + C,,, xo.j + 
x U,D < 1. So x does not satisfy (4) a contradiction to our assumption. ??
Given x: E FSM(G; P), Lemma 3.10 implies the following representation 
of T(x) 
T(x) = {(u,w} E E:u~~(v) + u and gX(u) <U 0). (IO) 
We note that in [2], the extended support of a fractional stable matching is 
defined by (10). This equality shows that the two definitions are equivalent. 
3.3. Problem Reduction 
In this subsection we define for each fractional stable matching x a 
polytope, denoted FSM,,,, (G; P), that consists of the fractional stable match- 
ings whose support is included in T(X). Our main result here shows how to 
use a given stable matching p and a fractional stable matching x to compute 
a stable matching /J’ for (G; P) whose incidence vector is in FSM,(,,(G; I’). 
As an immediate consequence of this result we conclude that FSM(G; P) has 
an integral point if and only if FSM,(,,(G; P) has one. Thus, given any 
fractional stable matching X, solving (G; P) is equivalent to determining 
whether the polytope FSM,,,, (G; P) has an integral point. This property is 
essential for the algorithm we develop in the next section, where it will be 
combined with a procedure for generating a decreasing sequence of such 
polytopes, each strictly contained in the previous one, and each of them 
containing an integer point if and only if the original FSM(G; I’) has one. 
We begin by introducing some additional notation. Given a set of edges 
T c E, we denote by FSM,(G; P) the polytope defined by (2) (3) (4) and 
x = 
u,li 
0 foreach {u,u} EE\T. (11) 
It is clear that for any set of edges T L E, FSM,(G; P) c FSM(G; P) and, in 
particular-, every integral solution of FSM,(G; P) is the incidence vector of a 
stable matching for (G; P). Further, any such integral solution is the inci- 
dence vector of a matching whose edges are all in T. We now prove the muin 
result of this section. 
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THEOREM 3.11. Let x E FSM(G; P), and as’sume p is a stable matching 
fiw (G; P). Define the mapping CL’ from V into it.selfby 
Then p’ is a stable matching for (G; P), and its incidence vector i.s ill 
FSM,,*,(G; P). 
Proof. Let y denote the incidence vector of p. We first prove that the 
mapping /.L’ represents a matching. It has to be shown that P’(U) = u if and 
only if p’(u) = U. Let 6 E V and set u = P’(U). Note that for all three cases 
of (12), {u, c) is a fractional stable pair. We consider each case separately: 
(i) p(c) <I _a,(~>: Then u = P’(D) = CJ(~;), and by Lemma 3.8, c = 
Z,(U). Further, as p(v) <r u = c~(L;), Lemma 3.9, applied to y implies that 
Zx(u) = c -c,~ p(u). By (12) it follows that F’(U) = Z,(U) = U: 
(ii) c~(G) <<c p(u) < ZY,(v>: Then u = p’(c) = P(G), and by Lemma 
3.9, _a,(~) Go, u = P(U) <I, a,(u). The definition in (12) now implies that 
/J’(u) = p(u) = U. 
(iii) FY,(t;) <o F(U): Th en u = p’(o) = C,(C), and symmetric arguments 
to case (i) prove that in this case P’(U) = _a,,(~) = c. 
Let z be the incidence vector of k’. As F’ is a matching, z satisfies (2) 
and (3). Further, by the construction of p’. _a,(~) <, p’(u) <I 6,(c) for 
every z: E 17. Hence, by the definition of T( s> we have that p’ = E, (2) c 
T(x). It follows that zU~,~, = 0 whenever {u’, u’} E E \ T(x), implying that 
- satisfies (11) [for T = T(x)]. _ 
It remains to show that z satisfies the stability constraints of (G; PI. That 
is, we have to show that for each {IL, c} E E 
c zIc,i + c “t,j + zu,[ > 1. 
i>,,u j>, 11 
Let (u, U} E E. If (u, v} e T(N), then by Lemma 3.10 we can assume 
without loss of generalit): that _a,(~> >ti u. Therefore _a,(~) f 0 and so 
o E V’. Further, by the construction of p’, P’(O) aL, c.~(c) >[ u. Hence 
- = 1 and the stability constraint of {u, C) holds. 
~~~~m~“:,,=Yt”i; “:~‘E”“$(?;). ‘Note that p’(u) E (a (u), P(V), C,(C)} and 
P’(U) E {c*(u), L(U), C,(U)}, and consider two cases:’ 
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(i) p’(u) = C,(v) or p’(u) = C%;(u): As (u, u) E T(x), it follows that 
u <<a C,,(u) = p’(u). Hence, CjdtiU zn,j = 1, and the stability constraint of 
{u, u] holds. (The second case follows from symmetric arguments.) 
(ii> p’(u) E {_a,(~), E.L(u)] and p’(u) E {_a,(~), p(u)]: In this case (12) 
implies that p’(u) aa p(u) and p’(u) ail p(u). Hence, 
In particular, 
C ‘u,i + C Zn,j a C Yu,i + C Y0.j 2 l, 
i>,o j&U i>,li j&U 
where the last inequality holds because y E FSM(G; I’). 
We have seen that z satisfies (21, (3), (4), and (11). Hence z f 
FSM,,,,(G; P) and, as z is integral, it is a stable matching for (G; I’). ??
The next corollary follows immediately from Theorem 3.11 and is the key 
to our algorithm. 
COROLLARY 3.12. Let x E FSM(G; P). Then (G; P) has a stable match- 
ing if and only if it has one whose incidence vector is in FSM,(,,(G; P). 
4. THE ALGORITHM 
In this section we describe a polynomial procedure for solving stable 
matching problems. Our procedure uses linear programming to generate a 
finite sequence of fractional stable matchings that converges to the incidence 
vector of a stable matching, when such a matching exists. As linear program- 
ming is solvable in polynomial time (see, e.g., Schrijver [I4]), we are able 
to obtain an algorithm for the stable matching problem with polynomial 
complexity. 
For given T c E and {u, V] E T, we consider the linear programs 
m={y,,,: Y E FSM,(G; P)) 
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min{y,,,: y E FSM,(G; P)}. 
We represent optimal solutions to the above linear programs by y + and y -, 
respectively. As T and {u, u} will always be identified by the context, no 
confusion will arise with this notation. We remark that these linear programs 
do not necessarily have unique optimal solutions. 
Our algorithm solves the stable matching problem (G; P) by iteratively 
solving a sequence of linear programs of the above type. The following results 
are used to establish the correctness of this procedure. 
LEMMA 4.1. Let x E FSM(G; P) nnd y E FSM,.,,,(G: P). Then 
T(y) c T(x). 
Proof. As y satisfies (11) with respect to T = T(x), yu, v > 0 implies 
crX(u) <ti u Q, a;(u) and cX(u> <,, t: <U Z,(u). In particular, for every G E 
V, c?(c) <v ~~(0) <c ZY(u) <” a;(u). By the definition of T(x) and T(y) 
in (8) it follows that T(y) c T(x). ??
LEMMA 4.2. Assume x E FSM(G; P) and E+(r) Z E,(x). Let (u. 6) I-w 
a pair in E+(x) \ E,( ) x such that u = gz(o), and let T = T( xl. 
(a> Ify&= 1, then T( y+) c T(x). 
(b) Ify,~~ = 0, then T(y-) c T(x). 
(cl Zfy,;, < 1 and y& > 0, then (G; P) has no stable matching. 
Proof. Note first that if E+(x) # E,(x), then trivially there is a pair 
{u, v) E E+(x) \ E,(x) such that u = _a,(~>. Now, if y: ~ = 1, then crz(u) = 
cY+(v) = cY+(v) <” 77z(z)) and, by Lemma 4.1, T(y’) c T(x). Further, 
{u, a,(u)} E T(x) \ T(y+), implying that T(y+) c T(x). We now consider 
when yU;O = 0. We recall that by Lemma 3.8, z! = a,(u). Since, by Lemma 
4.1, T(y-) c T(x), we conchide that Ts;,-(u) <U a,(u) = U. Thus, as 
{u, 2;) E T( y-), we conclude that I’( y-) c T(x). Finally, if ylzI, < 1 and 
yUyl, > 0 then 0 < yU,, < 1, for all y E FSM,(,,(G; I’). Hence there is no 
stable matching for (G; P) w h ose incidence vector is in FSM,(G; P), and by 
Corollary 3.12, (G; P) has no stable matching. ??
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THE ALGOKITHM. 
begin 
Let x be a fractional stable matching for (G; P) 
while E+(x) # E,(x) do 
choose {u, V} E E+(x) \ E,(r) such that u = _a,(~). 
set T := T(x) 
if y,Tc = lthen x:=y+ 
if YL < 1 and y, = Othen x:=y- 
if Yz,,. < 1 and ylrl:> 0 then 
output “no stable matching” stop 
output the stable matching p := T(x) 
end 
THEOREM 4.3. The algorithm terminates after at most 1 El iterations, 
either with a stable matching p for (G; P) or with the conclusion that none 
exists. 
Proof. Termination of this algorithm is guaranteed, since as long as 
neither of the two termination criteria is met, parts (a) and (b) of Lemma 4.2 
imply that the algorithm generates a sequence of fractional matchings whose 
extended supports have monotonically decreasing cardinality. As IT(x)1 < I El 
for each x E FSM(G; P) and, in particular, for the initial fractional stable 
matching, it follows that the algorithm must stop after at most IEl iterations. 
Assume now that at termination the first criterion [E+(x) = E,(x)] is 
met, and let x be the final fractional stable matching. Then by Lemma 3.1, x 
is the incidence vector of a stable matching for (G; P). Further, by the 
definition of T(x) it is clear that I_L = T(x) is the matching whose incidence 
vector is x. 
Finally, if the alternative termination criterion is met ( yU:l. < 1 and 
yt~ 1: > O), part (c) of Lemma 4.2 asserts that no stable matching exists. W 
Since the initial fractional stable matching x can be found by solving a 
single linear program and each iteration requires solving at most two linear 
programs, this algorithm yields a method that solves a stable matching 
problem (G; P) by solving at most 2) El + 1 linear programs. 
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